Search is embeded in an overlapping-generations model. Young people participate a centralized market and a decentralized market sequentially and olds only participates the centralized market. The demographic feature allows analytical tractability. In a series examples, positve inflation rates are Pareto optimal.
Introduction
Starting with Kiyotaki and Wright [6] , models with pairwise meetings at random have come to play a prominent role in monetary theory. In the initial models, the set of allowable individual portfolios is small-people hold either 0 or 1 unit of some asset. However, such models are unsuited for the study of standard monetary policies like money creation at a rate. If the set of individual portfolios is generalized, then there is a well-known problem of endogenous heterogeneity. Such problem makes the model not tractable. The analytical results are limited to existence results and only for take-it-orleave-it offers (see Zhu [16] ). 1 Other results like the study of money creation have to be studied numerically (e.g. Deviatov [4] and Molico [10] ).
There are two approaches to getting around endogenous heterogeneity, one by Shi [12] (Shi) and another by Lagos and Wright [9] (LW). In Shi, the decision-making unit is a family that consists of a continuum of members, and the basic idea is that outcomes of pairwise trade of members average out. In LW, agents trade in a centralized market following pairwise trade. Because agents have quasi linear preferences on centralized-traded goods, they have the same marginal value of money at that stage, and, as a result, they leave the centralized stage with the same wealth. The main message from Shi and LW is optimality of the Friedman rule. 2 In this paper, I embed the centralized-decentralized setup of LW in an OLG setting with two-date lived people. Young people participate a centralized market and a decentralized market sequentially and old people only participate the centralized market. In such a model, old people are at a corner-they sell all their assets, and therefore, the inherited distribution of asset holdings at the start of a date is not a state variable. 3 Although the assumption that all holders of assets are at a corner is special-special in the same way as special assumptions in Shi and LW, the OLG model permits one effect missing from Shi and LW: the possible role of lump-sum money creation as a risk-sharing device. That role is the main focus of my presentation for two reasons. First, the risk induced by pairwise trade would be present in Shi if the family were small; or, it would be present in LW if agents have different marginal values of money at centralized stages. Second, an inability of agents to share risk explicitly is at the heart of giving money a role in Shi and LW. The demand for money depends on other assumptions such as private information about pairwise-trade outcomes that limit other ways of sharing risk-if people could make ex ante deals contingent on pairwise-trade outcomes, then pairwise trade would not require money.
perhaps an unintended consequence, is that the risk-sharing effect of money creation is eliminated. In contrast, the OLG model does not have to eliminate risk, and therefore, it opens the door to studying the risk-sharing effect.
The OLG model differs from Shi and LW in another aspect. In Shi and LW, the critical (real) interest rate is the inverse of the discount factor minus unity. In the OLG model, the general result is that in the absence of pairwise trade, there is a Pareto optimal equilibrium with high enough interest rates. Because I limit consideration to stationary settings and equilibria, the optimality criterion for the OLG model is a nonnegative interest rate, which implies the critical interest rate is zero. Given such difference, a finding that inflation is Pareto optimal in the OLG setting is comparable to a finding that a growth rate of money higher than the Friedman rule is optimal in versions of Shi and LW in which the risk induced by pairwise trade is not eliminated by special assumptions.
From now on, I focus on LW and the OLG model when making comparison because of their similarities. In fact, there is a sort of observational equivalence between LW and the OLG model with similar quasi linearity. Observational equivalence means that two models have the same equilibrium centralized-market prices and decentralized-market allocations. When observational equivalence holds, the risk induced by pairwise trade is effectively eliminated in the OLG model
The OLG model can be set up such that observational equivalence does not hold and so risk is not eliminated. To choose such a setup, LW serves as a helpful guidance. An obvious way to keep risk in LW is to add some curvature to quasi-linearity preferences. Another way is to introduce some shocks that limit the agents's ability to adjust money holdings at centralized stages. The second way seems more interesting. After all, if agents can adjust money holdings by their wish (that is, they are able to fully insure themselves against the risk induced by pairwise trade), why bothers the central bank to intervene. Given the full ability to self insure, quasi linearity plays a secondary role-it assures that agents are willing to adjust money holding to the same level.
It is easy to incorporate self-insurance ability in the OLG setting. I use the probability that olds can produce to represent that ability. The basic analytical result of optimality of inflation is the following. Under take-itor-leave-it offers by buyers in pairwise meetings, if the above probability is not unity, then inflation is Pareto optimal for a class of utility functions. As shown by a computational example, the highest optimal inflation rate is negatively correlated to that probability, and it is bounded away from zero as that probability is not close to unity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I set out the basic model in section 2. In section 3, I establish existence for a general setting of the model. The observational equivalence is shown in section 4. Section 5 is for optimality of inflation. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Here I first describe the environment and then give the equilibrium definition.
Environment
Time is discrete, dated as t ≥ 0. At the start of a date, there are N ≥ 3 types of newly-born agents, and each type is a continuum with measure 1/N . Each date has two stages, 1 and 2. Each agent lives for three consecutive stages. An agent is young on his first date (or his first two stages), and old on his second date (or his third stage). There is a general produced good at stage 1. There are N types of special and produced goods at stage 2. Goods perish at the end of a stage. At stage 1, a young consumes and produces the general good, and an old consumes the general good, while the old's production ability is determined by an idiosyncratic shock that occurs at the start of the stage. In specific, an old is able to produce with probability λ, and is not with probability 1 − λ. At stage 2, a type n agent consumes type n special good and produces type n + 1 (mod N) special good.
The agent's utility from consuming q at his i th stage is u i (q), i = 1, 2, 3. The agent disutility from producing q at his i th stage is c i (q), i = 1, 2. If the agent is able to produce at this third stage, the disutility from producing q is c 3 (q). The agent's life-time utility from a consumption-production stream is the sum of corresponding utility and disutility at all stages. The agent maximizes the expected life-time utility. The basic assumptions of functions are the following. At stage 1 of a date, all (living) agents meet in a centralized market, and at stage 2, all agents are randomly matched in pairs. Because an agent lives for three stages, only young agents are matched at stage 2. A stage-2 meeting is a single-coincidence meeting if it is between a type n agent and a type n + 1 agent. Other meetings are irrelevant. Trade is anonymous at all stages. As a result, money plays an essential role in the economy.
Money is durable and supplied by the government. The initial money stock is sold to the public at the date-0 stage-1 market, and the revenue is used in a way that does not enter the individual decision problems. The government does not sell money since t ≥ 1. But there is a lump sum money transfer to old agents in the amount of τM t units of money at the start of t + 1, where M t denotes date-t money stock. Related to the timing of money transfer is the problem that olds may not be able to pay a lump tax (τ < 0). To avoid this problem, I restrict τ ≥ 0, and it suffices to note here that the restriction does not affect the main results of the paper.
Definition of equilibrium
The trade in the stage-1 market is competitive. Let κ t denote the real balance at the date-t market. I use the ratio of the individual money holding to M t as the individual state variable at date t. The value for a young agent with x (holding xM t amount of money) at the end of t is
Trade in a pairwise meeting is determined by generalized Nash bargaining where the buyer's bargaining power is θ ∈ (0, 1]. If a buyer with x b meets a seller with x s at date t, then the trade is determined by
Let the implied buyer's and seller's payoffs be denoted by f (x b , x s ; κ t+1 ) and g(x b , x s ; κ t+1 ), respectively. Letting π t be the date-t pre-matching distribu-tion of the individual states, the pre-matching value of having x is
A young agent in the date-t stage-1 chooses (q, q 0 , x) to solve
and the set of the solutions to (4) is denoted by
Because the function v needs not be concave, the set X needs not be a singleton. The support of π t , denoted as supp π t , should be a subset of X(κ t , κ t+1 , π t ), and the market-clearing condition is R xπ t (dx) = 1.
Definition 1 A monetary equilibrium is a sequence {(κ t , π t )} ∞ t=0 such that κ t > 0, supp π t ⊂ X(κ t , κ t+1 , π t ), and R xπ t (dx) = 1. A monetary equilibrium {(κ t , π t )} is a stationary equilibrium if (κ t , π t ) = (κ, π) all t.
Existence of a stationary monetary equilibrium
For existence, the basic approach is to apply a fixed point theorem to the mapping implied by Definition 1. As is well known, to carry out this approach, one has to find a positive lower bound on real balances preserved by that mapping. There are settings (e.g. u The mapping, denoted T , is explicitly defined as follows. The domain of T is denoted by I × Π, where I ≡ [κ 0 , κ 1 ] and Π is the set of probability measures on
Here, κ 0 > 0 and κ 1 are lower and upper bounds on real balances, and Z 0 ≥ 0 and Z 1 are lower and upper bounds on the individual states. Those bounds are specified later. To see the mapping, fix (κ, π) ∈ I × Π. First, let v(.; κ, π) : R + → R be defined by (3) with (κ t+1 , π t ) = (κ, π). Next, let X(κ, κ, π) ⊂ R + be the set of optimal solutions to (4) with v(.; κ t+1 , π t ) = v(.; κ, π). Next, let X (κ, π), a set of probability measures on R + , be defined by all randomization over X(κ, κ, π, τ ). Finally, let T (κ, π) = {(κ 0 , π 0 )}, where
By definition, (κ, π) is a stationary equilibrium if (κ, π) is a fixed point of T . The next lemma says that if T maps I × Π into I × Π, then T has a fixed point.
2) E § > 1 and so κ 0 ∈ I. By (R.3) and by construction in (7), π 0 ⊂ Π. Now letΠ be the set of all probability measures on [Z 0 , Z 1 ] equipped with the weak* topology. Let V be the set of real-valued continuous functions on [0, Z 1 ] equipped with the sup norm topology. By theorem of maximum (applied to (1) and (2)) and by [3, 14.7 
compact-valued, and convex-valued from I × Π toΠ. Because § 7 → E § is continuous onΠ, it follows that T : I × Π →I × Π is u.h.c., compact-valued, and convex-valued. Then by Fan's fixed point theorem (see [3, p.p . 550]), T has a fixed point.
What remains to be done is to find κ 0 , κ 1 , Z 0 , and Z 1 that are preserved by T (or assures (R.1)-(R.3)). Because c 1 in (U.1) is weakly convex and u 3 in (U.3) is weakly concave, the following no-arbitrage assumption is needed to preserve κ 1 and Z 1 .
Regarding Z 0 , it could be a concern because as u 3 (0) = −∞ and λ = 0, Z 0 must be positive to make sure that (3) is well defined. The main concern is to preserve κ 0 . As indicated above, one needs to show that by holding an extra unit of money, the marginal payoff in the stage-2 trade is sufficiently large. To this end, I need the following assumption.
Uniqueness of q * i in (U.5) is not essential. As implied by (U.5), µ(q) should not diverge to ∞ as q → 0, which can be satisfied by many functions (e.g., both u 2 and c 2 are power functions). The reason that µ(q) matters is as follows. Consider a meeting between a buyer with x and a seller with y, and let (q, l) denote the trade in the meeting. To derive a useful lower bound on the marginal payoff for the buyer, I have to incorporate
0 (y + l; κ, π) as part of the bound. If θ = 1, the mapping x 7 → f (x, y; κ, π) is differentiable in x and the derivative is bounded below by a. But if θ < 1, there are two problems. First, x 7 → f (x, y; κ, π) need not be differentiable, and second, even it is differentiable, both µ(q) and a are part of a lower bound of the derivative. Therefore, I have to take µ into consideration. The problem of non differentiability is dealt with by an approximating sequence (see Lemma 3 (iii)). The next is the main result of this section.
Proposition 1 There exists a monetary stationary equilibrium under (U.1)-(U.5).
Proof. See the appendix.
Observational equivalence between the OLG and LW models
Lagos and Wright [9] present a search model with infinitely-lived agents.
Trade in the LW model also occurs in the centralized and decentralized mar-kets alternatively. Because of quasi linear preferences on the centralizedtrade goods, all agents leave the centralized market with the same wealth in equilibrium. Such outcome has its counterpart in the OLG model-young agents start in the stage-1 market with the same wealth. In fact, there is observational equivalence between two models at some circumstance. Here observational equivalence means that two models generate the same stage-1 prices and the same stage-2 outcomes, and, in particular, a stgae-2 outcome includes transfers of goods and money in all in-equilibrium-path meetings in that stage. 5 Now I sketch a version of the LW model. There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents with measure one. The agents are specialized as in the OLG model. Also, there are two stages per date, and the general good is produced at stage 1 and the special good is produced at stage 2. An agent stage-i utility is
, where q stands for consumption and q 0 for production. The special assumption is C 1 (q) = q. The agent maximizes expected discounted utility with period discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) and with no within-period discount. The initial money stock is evenly distributed among agents and there is a lump sum money transfer in the amount of τM t at the start of each t ≥ 1.
6 Agents meet in a centralized market at stage 1 and are randomly matched in pairs at stage 2.
Stage-1 trade is competitive and the real balance in the date-t market is denoted by κ t . The buyer's bargaining power at a stage-2 meeting is denoted by θ. To define the LW equilibrium, it is convenient to first define some functions. Let κ > 0. Let the functionw(.; κ) : R + → R be defined bỹ
where
subject to l ≤ x b , and let (q 0 , l 0 ) denote the solution, and letf
Then let the 5 Obeservational equivalence between OLG and infinite-lived-agent models is stuied in other context, e.g., economic growth in Aiyagari [1] . The definition of equivalence may vary by context. 6 The version in [9] has money injection before stage 2 (and hence τ can be negative). If one uses that version, then observational equivalence still holds by adjusting timing of money injection in the OLG model, . functionṽ(.; κ) : R + → R be defined bỹ
I again use the ratio of the individual money holding to M t as the individual state variable at date t. If the individual state x is large, then the individual discounted expected utility at the end of t is notw(x; κ t+1 ). But suppose that it is and that all agents leave date-t stage 1 with 1. Theñ v(x; κ t+1 ) becomes the value of having x before date-t matching. Consequently, an agent with x at date-t stage-1 market chooses (q, q 0 , x 0 ) to solve
On the other hand, suppose thatṽ(.; κ t+1 ) satisfies some conditions and that no agent holds x far from unity before date-t stage-1 trade. Then all agents consumeq * 1 and leave stage 1 with 1, andw(.; κ t+1 ) on the domain [0, 2] is the value function defined on the individual states at the end of t. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 2 A LW equilibrium is a positive sequence {κ t } such that κ t+1 < q * 1 and (q * 1 ,q * 1 + (1 − x)κ t , 1) solves (11) with x ≤q * 1 /κ t + 1.
To simplify exposition, Definition 2, unlike the equilibrium definition in [9] , restricts the pre-matching distributions of money to degenerate ones. The next proposition establishes observational equivalence.
Proposition 2 Fix β, (U 1 , C 1 ), and (U 2 , C 2 ) in the LW model. In the OLG model, suppose (u i , c i ) = (U i , C i ) for i = 1, 2, and suppose either (i) λ = 1 and (u 3 , c 3 ) = (βαU 1 , βC 1 ) where αU 0 1 (2q * 1 ) = 1, or (ii) λ = 0 and u 3 = βC 1 . If {κ t } is a LW equilibrium for some given τ , then {(κ t , π t )} with supp π t = {1} is an OLG equilibrium with the same stage-2 outcomes.
Proof. We give a proof as λ = 1 and (u 3 , c 3 ) = (βαU 1 , βC 1 ), and the same logic applies to the other case. The next three claims constitute the proof.
Claim 1: There exists some ε > 0 such that w(x; κ t+1 ) = β[αu 1 (2q * 1 ) − 2q 4) . This is obvious.
Note that the choices of (u i , c i ) in Proposition 2 do not depend on τ . Also note that the notion of observational equivalence does not require that all quantities in two equilibria be identical. Indeed, the stage-1 date-t output is the OLG equilibrium is greater than that in the LW equilibrium, all t. But such difference is superficial at least for comparing welfare under different τ . This point is illustrated by the next corollary. Without loss of generality, the corollary is restricted to stationary equilibria.
Corollary 1 Let β, (U i , C i ), λ and (u i , c i ) be as in proposition 2. Consider two rates of money injection, τ 1 and τ 2 . Let {κ jt } with κ jt = κ j all t be a LW equilibrium as τ = τ j , and letṼ j be the expected lifetime utility for the agent starting with 1. Let V j be the agent expected lifetime utility in the equivalent OLG equilibrium.
Proof. This is obvious.
Finally, one may wonder whether the opposite of Proposition 2 holds. To be precise, fix (u i , c i ) in the OLG model and let {(κ t , π t )} be an OLG equilibrium. The opposite of Proposition 2 means that for the LW model with some β, (U 1 , C 1 ) and (U 2 , C 2 ), there is an equilibrium with the same stage-1 prices and stage-2 outcomes. The following is a counter-example. Let θ = 1, u 0 3 (0) = ∞, λ = 0, and τ = 0 in the OLG model. It turns out there exists a unique stationary monetary equilibrium (κ, π) with supp π = {1}. Consider a LW equilibrium with the same real balance κ. As shown in [9] , all buyers leave stage 2 with zero in the LW equilibrium. But in the OLG equilibrium, all buyers leave stage 2 with more than zero.
Optimality of inflation
To begin with, let κ(τ ) denote the set of the stationary-equilibrium real balances under τ . If there is a unique stationary equilibrium under τ , then let V (τ ) denote the agent expected life-time utility in that stationary equilibrium, and let V i (τ ) denote the agent stage-i expected utility. (Note that V (τ ) = P V i (τ ).) Also, letV (τ ),V 1 (τ ),V 3 (τ ), andκ(τ ) denote the corresponding terms in the same OLG model in the absence of pairwise trade, labelled as the background model. In the background model, the critical real interest rate is zero, and inflation is not Pareto optimal, or simply,
Suppose that κ(0) is singleton and that κ 0 (0) < 0. Then inflation is Pareto optimal (but not Pareto dominant) if V 0 (0) > 0. To see how V 0 (0) > 0 is possible, it is helpful to first see what pairwise trade in the present model brings in compared to the background model. Pairwise trade brings in two effects: the demand for money is enhanced and idiosyncratic shocks are incurred. Because of the first effect, κ(0) >κ(0), which implies V 1 (0) <V 1 (0), and also more average consumption at old than in the background model. Because of the second effect, the old's consumptions spread out. Overall, one expects that
Now consider what would be caused by inflation (as τ closed to zero). First, with less real balance, V 
The interest here is that the risk-sharing effect is not eliminated, and it turns out that this effect can be dominant. Before turning to that discussion, it is worth noting that λ ∈ (0, 1) implies that olds face exogenous idiosyncratic shocks. As indicated above, inflation is not Pareto optimal in the background model. Therefore, given the results established below, it is important to draw a line between the endogenous risk induced by pairwise trade and exogenous shocks to olds.
To simplify analysis, I restrict θ (the buyer's bargaining power) as unity. With additional assumptions on u 3 , I can show V 0 (0) > 0 for the simplest case λ = 0. Proof. Let q 1 (κ) be the optimal young consumption from the problem in (4) 
as τ is close to zero. By the implicit function theorem, the mapping (κ, τ ) 7 → ∆(κ, τ ) is differentiable. By θ = 1, the value function v is strictly concave and differentiable and supp π = {1}. It follows that given τ , κ ∈ κ(τ ) is a zero to the equation
To show the mapping τ 7 → κ(τ ) is single-valued, it suffices to show F 1 (κ, τ ) > 0 or simply ∆ 1 (κ, τ ) ≤ 1. (Here and below, we let G i (x 1 , x 2 ) denote the partial derivative of the function G w.r.t.
is increasing in κ for fixed τ . But this and ∆ 1 > 1 and concavity of u and u 3 imply (12) can not hold for two different κ for fixed τ , a contradiction. So it must be F 1 (κ, τ ) > 0. Differentiability of τ 7 → κ(τ ) then follows from the implicit function theorem immediately. Now assume by contradiction that κ
If the former, then differentiate (12) with κ = κ(τ ); because u 0 3 (q)q is non decreasing in q and κ 0 (τ ) ≥ 0, the derivative at the left side is negative, while the derivative at the right side is positive, which is impossible. So it must be η 0 (τ ) ≤ κ 0 (τ ). But this and κ 0 (τ ) ≥ 0 imply dF dτ (κ(τ ), τ) > 0, which again is impossible. So it must be κ 0 (τ ) < 0. Finally, by definition, V 1 (τ ) = u 1 (q 1 ) − c 1 (q 1 + κ) and NV 2 (τ ) = u(q) − q and
, and that by (13),
Using the last three equalities and differentiating V (τ ) = P V i (τ ) leads to
which together with κ
As is clear from the proof, the assumption that u 3 ), then neighborhood of zero, the mapping τ 7 → κ(τ ) is single-valued and differentiable, and, moreover, κ 0 (τ ) < 0 and V 0 (0) > 0 as λ < 1.
Proof. We first consider λ = 1. The proof is similar to the last proof. We let u and l(κ, τ ) and q 1 (κ) and w(x; κ, τ ) be the same as in that proof. We also let q 3 (x; κ) and w 0 (x; κ) in Lemma 2 (in Appendix) be written as q 3 (x; κ, τ ) and w 0 (x; κ, τ ). As in the last proof, we use the fact that v is concave and differentiable and supp π = {1}. By that fact, κ ∈ κ(τ ) can be determined as a zero to some equationF (κ, τ ) for given τ . By Lemma 2 (iii) and c
, we can show that l(κ, τ ) = 1 as κ ∈ κ(τ ). Therefore, for given τ , κ ∈ κ(τ ) is a zero to the equation √ q, c 31 (q)=q 2 /2, u 1 =u 2 =u 3 , and c 1 =c 2 =c 3 . For given λ, the third and fourth digits of V (τ ) are in the cell under the corresponding τ (e.g., λ=0, V (0.01)=2.8422). where q(κ, τ ) = w(2; κ, τ ) − w(1; κ, τ ). By the first order conditions from (1), κ 7 → q 3 (x; κ, τ ) is strictly increasing, and moreover, by c 0 3 (0) = 0 and by the implicit function theorem, (κ, τ ) 7 → q 3 (x; κ, τ ) and (κ, τ ) 7 → w(x; κ, τ ) are differentiable. To show τ 7 → κ(τ ) is single-valued, it suffices to shoŵ
q 3 (1; κ, τ ), and because u 0 3 (q)q is non decreasing in q, this implies ∂q ∂κ (κ, τ ) > 0. Differentiability of τ → κ(τ ) then follows from the implicit function theorem. For λ ∈ (0, 1), the proof is a straightforward combination of the arguments used for λ = 0 and λ = 1, and it is omitted.
The role played by two assumptions on c 3 is more technical than substantial. As is clear from the proof, c Table 1 summarizes computation results for a Proposition-4 setting with. As in the table, there is a negative correlation between λ and the highest optimal τ . This makes sense because larger λ means stronger self-insurance ability of olds, which makes money creation less helpful. For the same setting with λ = 1, computation shows that V (0) = V (0.1%) > V (0.2%), which suggests V 0 (0) ≤ 0. This also makes sense because when olds are fully able to insure themselves, the risk-sharing effect may be completely dominated by the losing-efficiency effect. Finally, consider the new regime of money injection with money injected before stage 2. It turns out that Proposition 4 is still valid under the new regime. For the case with λ < 1, because l(κ, τ ) < 1 as τ is close to zero under the old regime, equilibria under two regimes are identical. Using the Table- 1 setting for computation, results for λ < 1 under two regimes are identical over τ ≤ 9%. For the case with λ = 1, because l(κ, τ ) = 1 all τ under the old regime, equilibria under two regimes are different. Using the Table-1 There are many questions to ask. How do the details of the stage-2 trade affect the result? What if the stage 2 trade is competitive? Does the bargaining power matter? In fact, by setting the stage-2 trade competitive and adding idiosyncractic shocks comparable to the random matching shocks, using the Table 1 examples, the corresponding highest optimal inflation rates are a bit higher than those shown in Table 1 . Also, I suspect that the bargaining wedge (see [9] and [13] ) plays a significant role as θ < 1.
Regarding the model development, one line is to let agents live for more than two dates. This line is of interest because it is useful for some quantitative exercise. There are quite a few extensions that can be made with two-date-lived agents. One can extend the model by introducing capital as in [2] , and the dichotomy in [2] should be broken easily. Also, one can embed search into an OLG asset pricing model (e.g. Lebadie [8] ) to study how decentralized trade may affect equity premium.
of solutions to problems in (1) . Lemma 3 lemma gives some properties of the individual payoffs implied by the solution to the bargaining problem in (2) . Using results in Lemmas 2 and 3, we show in Lemma 4 that there are κ 0 , κ 1 , Z 0 , and Z 1 that are preserved by T .
Lemma 2 Let λ ∈ {0, 1}. Let q 3 (x; κ) be the optimal old consumption for an agent who ends his first day by x. For fixed κ, let the derivative of w(.; κ) at x be denoted by w 0 (x; κ).
(ii) The function w(.; κ) is strictly concave and differentiable.
Proof. Referring to (1), parts (i) and concavity in part (ii) are straightforward. Differentiability in part (ii) follows from the standard BenvenisteScheinkman argument. With differentiability, part (iii) follows from the envelope theorem.
For the bargaining problem in (2) with κ t+1 = κ, let the solution be denoted by (q(x b , x s ; κ), l(x b , x s ; κ)), which satisfies the first order conditions
(recallθ ≡ θ/(1 − θ)) and
In the rest of the proof, we suppress dependence of w, q, l, f , g, v and X on κ and π whenever the context is clear. y) ). There exists a sequence ε n ↓ 0 such that
Proof. For part (i), fix y and let x 2 > x 1 and let (q i , l i ) = (q(x i , y), l(x i , y)). By the standard argument that uses concavity of u 2 and w, convexity of c 2 , and conditions (15) and (16), we have q 2 > q 1 , l 2 ≥ l 1 , and x 2 − l 2 ≥ x 1 − l 1 . By the last two inequalities,
and by the first and last inequalities, f (x 2 , y) − f (x 1 , y) > 0. The upper bound on f (x 2 , y) − f (x 1 , y) is obvious.. For part (ii), fix y and let x 2 > x 1 and let (q i , l i ) = (q(y, x i ), l(y, x i )). Similar as in the proof of claim 1, we have q 2 < q 1 and x 1 + l 1 < x 2 + l 2 . It follows that g(y, x 2 ) > g(y, x 1 ). Now assume by contradiction that g(y,
But that is impossible, because the maximal of the bargaining problem (2) with (x b , x s ) = (y, x 1 ) is greater than that with (x b , x s ) = (y, x 2 ). For part (iii), fix (x, y) and let (q, l) = (q(x, y), l(x, y)). By above (17), we can find ε n ↓ 0 such that [l(x + ε n , y) − l(x, y)]/ε n → λ ∈ [0, 1]. Fix the sequence ε n . Letl(x + ε, y) = l + λε, and then letq(x + ε, y) be the q that satisfies (15) with l =l(x + ε, y). By the implicit function theorem, q(x + ε., y) is a C 1 of ε on a neighborhood of 0. Now differentiating (15), we have
where q 0 is the derivative ofq(., y) at x, where u
, and where A = u 2 (q) + w(x − l) − w(x) and
By the implicit function theorem, (15) defines q as a C 1 function of (x b , x s , l). By construction, as ε n is close to zero, l(x + ε n , y) is close tol(x + ε n , y), and, therefore, q(x + ε n , y) is close toq(x + ε n , y). So (15) implies for small ε n ,
as desired.
Lemma 3 (iii) gives a useful lower bound on the payoff as a buyer by holding extra ε unit of money. The reason for appearance of µ(q) is explained in the main text. The problem of differentiability of x 7 → f (x, y) is dealt with by the sequence ε n . The next lemma completes the proof of proposition 1. Proof. The proof has three steps.
Step 1 specifies κ 1 and then establishes (R.1).
Step 2 has two parallel steps, 2.1 and 2.2, and for one of two exclusive cases, each parallel step specifies κ 0 and Z 0 and then establishes (R.2) and min X(κ, κ, π) ≥ Z 0 for κ ∈ [κ 0 , κ 1 ].
Step 3 specifies Z 1 and then establishes max X(κ, κ, π) ≤ Z 1 for κ ∈ [κ 0 , κ 1 ]. By Lemma 2 (ii), w is strictly concave and differentiable, a fact we use throughout.
Step 1. By (U.4), we can find some κ 1 > 1 satisfying 
To see (19)⇒(R1), fix κ > κ 1 − 1 (below we set κ 0 < 1) and x ≥ 1. Let ε > 0. By Lemma 3 (i), f (x, y) − f (x − ε, y) < ε(A 1 + A 2 ), where 
By (20) and Lemma 2 (iii) and κ ≥ κ 1 − 1, N (1 + τ )[v(x) − v(x − ε)]/(κε) is bounded above by the right side of (19) for sufficiently small ε. But cutting production from Q ≥ κ to Q − κε at stage 1, the disutility decreases by at least c 0 1 (κ 1 − 1)κε. By (19), this implies x / ∈ X(κ, κ, π).
Step 2.1. If u 3 (0) = 0 or λ = 1, then let Z 0 = 0 and by (U.5), we can find some κ 0 < 1 satisfying 
Now min X ≥ Z 0 is trivial. To see (21) and (22) 
By (23) and Lemma 2 (iii) and κ ≤ 2κ 0 , (1 + τ )[v(x) − v(x − ε)]/(κε) is bounded below by the left side of (22) for some sufficiently small ε. But increasing production from Q < q * 1 + κ to Q + κε at stage 1, the disutility increases by at most c 0 1 (q * 1 +2κ 0 )κε. Because the optimal young consumption from the problem in (4) with κ t = κ is bounded below by q * 1 , this and (22) imply (R.2).
Step 2.2. If u 3 (0) = −∞ and λ = 0, then we can find 0 < Z 0 < 1 and κ 0 < 1 satisfying (N − 2)u 0 3 ( 
The argument for (24)⇒ min X ≥ Z 0 and (25)⇒(R.2) is similar to that in step 2.1 and is omitted.
Step 3. By (U.4), we can find Z 1 > 1 satisfying 
The argument for (19)⇒ max X ≤ Z 1 is similar to that in step 1 and is omitted.
